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Abstract
Despite an abundance of empirical evidence on crime spanning over forty
years, there exists no consensus on the impact of the criminal justice sys-
tem on crime activity. We argue that this may be due to the combined
effect of simultaneity, omitted variable bias and aggregation bias that may
confound many of these studies. We construct a new panel data set of lo-
cal government areas in Australia and develop a testing framework for the
implications of economic theory on crime behaviour. The empirical results
suggest that the criminal justice system can potentially exert a much greater
influence on crime activity than is the common view in the literature. In
addition, we find that increasing the risk of apprehension and conviction
is more influential in reducing crime than raising the expected severity of
punishment. Violent crime is more persistent and relatively less responsive
to law enforcement policies compared to non-violent crime.
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1 Introduction
Crime, originating from the root of Latin cerno¯ (“I decide, I give judgment”),
is the behavior judged by the State to be in violation of the prevailing norms
that underpin the moral code of society. Where informal social controls are not
sufficient to deter such behavior, the State may intervene to punish or reform those
responsible through the criminal justice system. The precise sanctions imposed
depend on the type of crime and the prevailing cultural norms of the society. For
offences deemed to be serious, criminal justice systems have historically imprisoned
those responsible, in the hope that a combination of deterrence and incapacitation
may lower the crime rate. Currently, more than 9.8 million people in the world are
institutionalised for punishment, almost half of which are held in America, China
and the U.K. (Walmsley, 2009). Over the past thirty years, the American prison
population has more than quadrupled. Such massive increases in the U.S. prison
population may be explained almost entirely by an increase in punitiveness rather
than an increase in crime rates (see e.g. Raphael and Stoll, 2009), leading some
to label this extraordinary measure one of the largest scale policy experiments of
the century.
Other countries such as the U.K. and Australia have also experienced rising
prison populations. For instance, the incarceration rate in NSW, which is the
most populous state in Australia, has increased over 23 percent in the last 10
years and is currently higher than that of Germany. The NSW prison system now
costs taxpayers more than $1 billion per year.1 At the same time crime rates have
remained relatively stable, leading some to declare such high rates of incarceration
a policy failure.
How effective is the criminal justice system in deterring crime? To what extent
do changes in the expected punishment influence the motivation of individuals to
engage in illegal pursuits? How much wrong-doing does each additional prisoner
avert?
1Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision (2010), Report on
Covernment Services 2010, Chapter 8, Productivity Commission, Canberra.
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In order to address these questions in a constructive way it is important to
recognise that changes in the aggregate crime rate stem from individual behavior.
Policies such as increased sentence lengths may lower the crime rate through two
possible channels; deterrence and incapacitation. It is well accepted in the litera-
ture that for a particular policy to be effective it cannot operate on incapacitation
effects alone (Durlauf and Nagin, 2010). In turn, for a policy to deter criminal
behavior it must be designed with an understanding of what causes individuals to
engage in criminal activity.
During the early part of the twentieth century criminal behavior was viewed
as a type of social illness. For example, the strain theory of Merton (1938) sug-
gests that crime is a behavioral response to social inequality. The seminal work of
Becker (1968) changed this view, postulating that individuals engage in such ac-
tivity simply because the subjective expected benefit exceeds the expected cost of
doing so. Criminals, therefore, do not differ from the rest of society in their basic
motivation but in their appraisal of benefits and costs. On this view a rational
criminal behaves in a calculated manner, considering the benefit of the illegal act
together with the risk of apprehension and conviction as well as the likelihood and
severity of potential punishment, which are a function of three separate stages of
processing through the criminal justice system pertaining to the roles of police,
courts and prison system respectively. The idea of a rational criminal represents
a major step forward in criminology and forges an important link with the deter-
rence hypothesis that underpins the criminal justice system − the notion that the
crime rate can be reduced by raising the expected cost of criminal activity.
Since the seminal work of Becker, a large empirical literature has developed,
seeking to inform public policy by collecting data on various populations and
building econometric models that describe criminal behavior of individuals. The
public concern about crime is well justified given the pernicious effects that it
has on economic activity, as well as on the quality of one’s life in terms of a
reduced sense of personal and proprietary security. However, despite the rich
history of econometric modeling spanning over forty years, it appears there is
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largely a disconnect between theory and evidence as we have not been able to
identify a single study that examines statistically the implications of economic
theory on crime behavior of individual agents. Furthermore, there is arguably no
consensus on whether there is a strong deterrent effect of law enforcement policies
on crime activity. For example, Hirsch (1988) argues:
“Estimates of the magnitude of the deterrent effect vary... Further
empirical investigation is necessary in order to gain a more accurate
estimate of the magnitude of this deterrent effect coefficient, though
the true value of the coefficient is probably closer to 1 than to 0.3.”
(Hirsch (1988) p. 271).
In contrast, Cornwell and Turmbull (1994) conclude:
“The ability of the criminal justice system to deter crime is much
weaker than previous results indicate... A fundamental flaw in each of
the [previous] studies is an inability to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity in the unit of observation.” (Cornwell and Turmbull, 1994, p.
361).
Recent studies also provide mixed evidence that are insufficient to draw clear
conclusions (see Section 3). The present paper revisits the economics of crime,
deterrence and punishment and provides new findings. In particular, we specify
a full econometric model of crime and develop a testing framework for the impli-
cations of economic theory on crime activity. The resulting restrictions appear to
be supported by the data. Our results show a much stronger effect of the criminal
justice system compared to the common view in the literature.
In addition, we find that increasing the risk of apprehension and conviction
exhibits a much larger effect in reducing crime compared to raising the expected
severity of punishment. This may have significant policy implications. For exam-
ple, if it were estimated that the cost of keeping a prisoner incarcerated for a year
was roughly equivalent to the cost of making a single additional arrest, then one
could justify a redirection of resources from prisons to policing.
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The difference between our results and those reported in a substantial body
of literature may be attributed to several reasons. First, omitted variable bias; it
is rarely the case that empirical studies of crime specify a complete econometric
model with all deterrence variables included. Using the available data we show that
the parameter estimates of the economic model of crime can be very sensitive to
model mis-specification and the exclusion of relevant deterrence variables, which
can lead practically to under-estimating the true effect of the criminal justice
system.
Second, aggregation bias; while the economic model of crime purports to rep-
resent individual behavior, most data involve some form of aggregation − often,
measurement takes place at the country or state level. This is likely to yield results
that are inconsistent with economic theory. For example, Levitt (2001) argues that
relying on national time series data can be particularly problematic since averag-
ing across all of the locales removes useful variation, which may potentially result
in misleading inferences. In the present study we are able to achieve a relatively
low level of aggregation since the unit of observation is the Local Government
Area (LGA) level in NSW. In addition, as it is shown, economic theory bears di-
rect implications on the econometric specification of the model of crime behavior,
which are testable using data constructed at the aggregate level. We find that
these restrictions are not rejected in our case, which indicates that the level of
aggregation used in this study is not harmful to modeling individual behavior.
Third, often the identification strategy employed in the literature is rather
problematic since the deterrence variables are treated as exogenous, or if otherwise,
the instruments used may not be orthogonal to the error term as they are likely
to be correlated with the deterrence variables omitted from the regression. This
study makes use of panel data analysis, which provides natural instruments with
respect to sufficiently lagged values of the endogenous regressors. Furthermore,
panel data analysis allows capturing different sources of unobserved heterogeneity,
which makes the orthogonality conditions more likely to be satisfied. The validity
of the instruments used is testable based on standard methods.
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Finally, we deviate from the majority of the literature by specifying a dynamic
model, which captures the essential feature of the behavior of individuals towards
crime in that in practice it takes time to adjust fully to changes in law enforcement
policies due to habit formation and costs of adjustment. This is important because
it permits distinguishing between the effect of law enforcement policies in the short-
and the long-run, and deriving equilibrium conditions as well as other meaningful
dynamic quantities such as mean and median lag length of the effects.
We note that our estimated results are specific to the type of crime considered
in the analysis. In particular, violent crime appears to be much more persistent
and relatively less responsive to changes in law enforcement policies compared to
non-violent crime. Furthermore, while the restrictions implied by economic theory
are found to be supported by the data for non-violent crime, this is not the case
for violent crime. These results can be considered natural given that Becker’s idea
of a criminal behaving in a rational manner is less likely to apply to violent crime,
which is often influenced by feelings of anger and jealousy rather than rational
behavior.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the economic model
of crime and motivates the key deterrence variables to be used in our empirical
analysis. Section 3 discusses the empirical evidence pertaining to crime deterrence
and analyses the problems inherent in using aggregate data to estimate the eco-
nomic model of crime. Section 4 presents the econometric specification employed
in the paper and its relationship with the underlying theory. Section 5 discusses
the empirical results. A final section concludes.
2 A review of the economic model of crime
This section reviews the economic model of crime in order to motivate the theoreti-
cal relationship between crime and deterrence and analyse some of its implications.
The framework extends Becker’s (1968) representation of criminal behavior as a
choice based on maximisation of expected utility. Consider an individual i who
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engages in an illegal act based on a comparison of the expected benefits and the
expected costs of doing so. The expected cost of criminal activity comprises both
the direct inputs of the criminal justice system (the likelihood and severity of pun-
ishment), as well as the opportunity cost of activity in the legal sector foregone.
Individual i will therefore engage in criminal activities if
piU
NL
i (Yi − (Ci + Si)) + (1− pi)UNLi (Yi) > ULi (Ii), (1)
where pi is the unconditional probability of conviction
2, Yi is the “income” flowing
from the criminal act, material or otherwise, Ci is the collateral costs of criminal
charges, Si is the cost to the individual of the sanction imposed as punishment
and Ii is the income from legal activity. The Ci are costs that are incurred upon
being charged with a crime but not necessarily punished; for example, social stig-
matisation and diminished employment prospects. The Ui are utility functions
representing the way in which individual i subjectively values benefits and costs
associated with legal (ULi ) and illegal (U
NL
i ) activities respectively. Rearranging,
we obtain the equivalent condition
pi
(
UNLi (Yi − (Ci + Si))− ULi (Ii)
)
+ (1− pi)
(
UNLi (Yi)− ULi (Ii)
)
> 0. (2)
The term on the left-hand side of the inequality is the expected net utility flowing
from criminal activity. With probability (1 − pi) the individual realises the full
benefit of criminal activity over and above the opportunity cost of legal activity.
With probability pi the benefit of criminal activity is deflated by Ci + Si. If the
expected utility of criminal activity net of the opportunity cost imposed by the
legal sector is positive, a rational individual i will engage in criminal behavior.
Therefore, under the assumption of rational, utility maximising agents, individual
i will engage in criminal behavior if and only if (2) holds. Formally the criminal
2It is assumed that an individual is punished if they are found guilty.
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decision is
ψi =
 1 if pi
(
UNLi (Yi − (Ci + Si))− ULi (Ii)
)
+ (1− pi)
(
UNLi (Yi)− ULi (Ii)
)
> 0
0 otherwise,
where ψi is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if individual i chooses to
commit a crime and 0 otherwise.
Following Ehrlich (1975) the probability of punishment is decomposed into its
three component parts: the probability of arrest, the probability of conviction
given arrest, and the probability of imprisonment given conviction. Such an ex-
tension of the Becker model more realistically represents the risk posed by the
criminal justice system. The transition from committing a criminal act to the
realisation of punishment involves multiple stages of processing through the crim-
inal justice system, none of which is certain. In order for punishment to occur, an
individual must first be caught and arrested, then be found guilty by a judiciary.
A further source of uncertainty follows since a judge must decide both the specific
sanction imposed as punishment (eg. imprisonment, fine, home detention) and
its severity. Expected utility from criminal activity is therefore represented as a
function of the probability of arrest (PA), the probability of conviction given arrest
(PC|A), the probability of imprisonment conditional on conviction (PP |C) and the
expected prison sentence length (S). These variables are the standard deterrence
variables that appear in the literature and are the focus of our analysis. For ease
of exposition, the opportunity cost flowing from the legal sector is set to zero.
Hence, the expected utility from criminal activity can be written as
E(UNLi ) = (1− PAi)UNLi (Yi) + PAi(1− PC|Ai)UNLi (Yi − Ci)
+PAiPC|AiPP |CiU
NL
i (Yi − Ci − Si)
+PAiPC|Ai(1− PP |Ci)UNLi (Yi − Ci − S ′i), (3)
where the first term on the right hand side represents the full benefit of criminal
activity in the case that one is not caught, which occurs with probability (1 −
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PAi), the second term represents the benefit from criminal activity in the event
that one is arrested but not convicted of the crime (deflated by Ci), occurring
with probability PAi(1− PC|Ai),3 while the third term represents the benefit from
criminal activity in the event that one gets caught, convicted and therefore is
punished (deflated by Ci + Si), occurring with probability PAiPC|AiPP |Ci . The
fourth term captures all cases where the criminal is caught and found guilty (as
with the previous term), but where an alternative to imprisonment is used. This
occurs with probability PAiPC|Ai(1−PP |Ci), and the benefit from criminal activity
is deflated by Ci + S
′
i, where S
′
i is the cost to the individual of this alternative
punishment. It is assumed that imprisonment is the most severe punishment
possible for any given crime − that is, Si > S ′i ∀ i.
The theoretical model has a number of implications for individual behavior
towards crime. These can be summarised by the following propositions.
Proposition 1 Increases in PAi, PC|Ai or PP |Ci decrease the expected utility de-
rived from criminal activity.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 2 The marginal deterrence effects of the criminal justice system are
ordered such that the effect of PAi is larger than that of PC|Ai, which in turn is
larger than the effect of PP |Ci.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1 outlines that a potential criminal behaves in a calculated manner,
taking into account the risk of apprehension and conviction as well as the likelihood
and severity of punishment for a given level of benefit of the criminal act. Hence,
the crime rate can be reduced by increasing the expected cost of criminal activity.
The intuition of Proposition 2 lies in that the price of being arrested and convicted
includes the cost incurred upon being charged but not necessarily punished, such
as social stigmatisation and diminished employment opportunities.
3Although it is likely that the collateral costs of criminal charges are greater if the individual is
actually convicted of crime, assuming that the full extent of these costs are incurred immediately
upon arrest greatly simplifies the exposition of the analysis.
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Thus, economic theory suggests that, ceteris paribus, policies targeting the
probability of arrest and the probability of conviction can be more effective in
deterring criminal activity than those targeting the probability of imprisonment,
assuming all policies are equally costly. Despite these important implications,
there appears to be a large disconnect between economic theory and empirical
evidence in the literature for reasons that may be attributed to factors analysed
in Section 3.
3 Evidence on Crime Deterrence
The nature of crime data available render the analysis of the effect of law enforce-
ment policies on criminal activity inherently problematic. Criminological research
logically began with the analysis of data collected from individuals. However such
data are self-reported and are doubtlessly affected by significant measurement er-
ror. Moreover, the time and cost involved in surveying a representative population
can be prohibitively large. An alternative is to use some form of aggregate data,
which describe crime in locales (for example local areas, states or countries) and
are based on official records rather than self-reported information.
However, empirical studies based on aggregate data are also not without prob-
lems, leading some to suggest that the use of individual and aggregate data may
be regarded as two complementary approaches (Trumbull, 1989). In particular,
aggregate data may inherently introduce a form of bias by invoking the “repre-
sentative agent” assumption, which implies that all individuals are homogeneous
and thus they behave in a similar manner. Furthermore, the use of aggregate
data introduces a problem of simultaneity that makes the causal effect of law en-
forcement policies on crime more difficult to identify. For example, an exogenous
upward shift in crime rate may overwhelm police resources, given that police re-
sources are fixed in the short term, causing the probability of arrest to decrease.
Increases in crime may also cause overcrowding in courts, leading individuals to
enter guilty pleas with the understanding that alternatives to imprisonment are
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more likely to be used (Nagin, 1978). To the extent that courts behave in this way
in response to overcrowding, both the conditional probabilities of conviction and
imprisonment are endogenous. Still another argument holds that an exogenous
increase in the crime rate may cause courts to increase sentence lengths in an
attempt to combat high rates of crime.
Despite the strong potential for simultaneity when the relation between crime,
policing and justice is modeled using aggregate data, many studies fail to control
for endogeneity, which casts serious doubt on their results (see e.g. Blumstein,
Cohen and Nagin, 1978). It is well known that in the presence of endogeneity,
least-squares based estimates of the economic model of crime are contaminated by
the reverse effect that crime may exhibit on law enforcement policies, and hence
are biased and inconsistent. Dills, Miron and Summers (2008) use aggregate data
to demonstrate that raw correlations between crime rates and deterrence variables
are frequently weak or even perverse due to the problem of simultaneity, and note
that any identification strategy would need to be powerful enough to partial out
the effect of deterrence on the crime rate and provide a result consistent with
economic theory.
A further problem that may arise in empirical studies that use aggregate data
is the potential for omitted variable bias in the estimated parameters. In partic-
ular, it is hardly ever the case that a complete model is specified that includes
all deterrence variables prescribed by economic theory. This is likely to be due
to lack of data or the fact that certain experimental designs intended to combat
endogeneity preclude the possibility of examining all deterrence variables of inter-
est. Whatever the appropriate explanation is, the evidence on crime deterrence
has come to conform broadly to several distinct sub-literatures, in which the ef-
fect of the probability of arrest, the probability of conviction, the probability of
imprisonment and the length of average sentence are rarely examined together.
Table 1 summarises the empirical results for some of the most widely cited con-
tributions to the crime deterrence literature using aggregate data. For each of the
studies noted, the table reports the sampling population, the unit of observation,
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the structure of the data followed by the sample size4, the method used to estimate
the model, the type of crime analysed and finally the actual results. Clearly, there
is a paucity of studies that estimate a fully specified economic model of crime, with
notable exceptions being the papers by Pyle (1984), Trumbull (1989) and Corn-
well and Trumbull (1994). However, in both Pyle (1984) and Trumbull (1989)
all deterrence variables are treated as exogenous and therefore least-squares based
methods are used to obtain estimates of the parameters. Trumbull justifies this
choice claiming that simultaneity is not a salient feature of the existing dataset,
based on the results of a Wu-Hausman specification test. Cornwell and Trumbull
(1994) treat the probability of arrest as endogenous but all remaining variables
as exogenous. The authors fail to find a statistically significant relationship be-
tween the deterrence variables and crime using a 2SLS procedure. Nevertheless,
they produce inferences based on least-squares, arriving at a conclusion similar to
Trumbull in that, as it is argued, the probability of arrest is exogenous.
However, even if reverse causality were not present in these data, the proba-
bility of arrest (when defined as number of arrests divided by the number of crime
incidents) is endogenous in the crime equation by construction, since the numer-
ator of the dependent variable (number of crime incidents) is the denominator in
the probability of arrest, which artificially induces a negative correlation between
the two variables (Nagin, 1978) − a phenomenon that is known as “ratio bias”
in the literature (see e.g. Dills, Miron and Summers, 2008). Figure 1 illustrates
this phenomenon using real time series data for NSW, aggregated across Local
Government Areas (LGAs).
Finally, although Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) observe that the ordering of
deterrence coefficients matches the ordering predicted by economic theory, they
do not explicitly test the significance of this ordering.5
The remaining studies restrict their attention to a particular variable of in-
4For panel data models the cross-sectional dimension, N , is given first, followed by the time
dimension, T .
5The reported coefficient estimates and standard errors in Cornwell and Trumbull (1994)
suggest that such a test would fail to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between successive
deterrent elasticities.
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Figure 1: Crime and deterrence, New South Wales (1996 - 2008)
terest. Failing to include all deterrence variables fosters a disconnect between
economic theory and empirical analysis. In order for a criminal to be punished,
the person must be arrested and found guilty first; omitting the probability of
arrest and conviction clearly ignores a fundamental aspect of the criminal decision
and is likely to lead to biased inferences. Furthermore, omitted variables may
invalidate estimation based on instrumental variables, as instruments may not be
orthogonal to the deterrence variables omitted from the regression. For example,
Mustard (2003) shows that arrest rates are likely to be negatively correlated with
the probability of conviction and sentence length. As a result the author con-
cludes that previous estimates of the marginal effect of the probability of arrest
may understate the true effect of the arrest rate by as much as fifty percent. The
following section analyses the econometric specification employed in this paper
and discusses some of the implications of the economic model of crime.
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4 Econometric Specification
The starting point of our analysis is to relate the number of offences committed
in a given LGA to the number of arrests, the number of convictions, the number
of imprisonments and the average sentence length. Since the level of crime in
each LGA depends on the size of the population, the latter is also included in the
aggregate regression. It will be demonstrated that many of the models estimated
in the literature are in fact a restricted version of this aggregate model. We remark
that we deviate from the literature in a significant way in that we also allow for
persistence in the level of crime due to habit formation and costs of adjustment,
thus specifying a dynamic model of crime. In contrast, common practice in the
literature presumes a static relation, where the entire effect of law enforcement
policies is assumed to be realised immediately within the same time period.
Our aggregate model is given by
ln crmit = δ ln crmit−1 + δ1 ln arrit + δ2 ln convit + δ3 ln imprit +
δ4 ln avsenit + δ5 ln income+ δ6 ln unemp+ δ7 ln popit +
δ8 ln popit−1 + uit, (4)
where crmit denotes the number of crime offences in LGA i at time t, and the
remaining variables are self-explanatory. Due to incapacitation effects alone, one
naturally expects that δj < 0 for j ≤ 4, while δ ∈ (0, 1) to ensure stationarity.
The economic model of crime postulates that criminals are rational individuals
who assess the risk of apprehension and conviction as well as the likelihood of
punishment prior to committing an offence, and ultimately evaluate the expected
benefit and cost associated with an illegal activity. Therefore, our hypothesis is
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that the model can be expressed in the following form:
ln
(
crmit
popit
)
= α ln
(
crmit−1
popit−1
)
+ β1 ln
(
arrit
crmit
)
+ β2 ln
(
convit
arrit
)
+β3 ln
(
imprit
convit
)
+ β4 ln avsenit + β5 ln incomeit
+β6 lnunempit + υit, 0 < α < 1, (5)
which can be rewritten as
ln crmrit = α ln crmrit−1 + β1 ln prbarrit + β2 ln prbconvit + β3 ln prbimprit
+β4 ln avsenit + β5 ln incomeit + β6 lnunempit + υit. (6)
Precise definitions of all variables used in our regression modelling are provided in
Table 2. Therefore, crime rate is a function of the empirical probability of arrest,
prbarr, the probability of conviction given arrest, prbconv, and the probability of
imprisonment given conviction, prbimpr, albeit with a dynamic effect of the deter-
rence variables on the crime rate, for which the speed of adjustment is determined
by the coefficient of the lagged value of the dependent variable. The inclusion of
sentence length, income and unemployment in the equation captures the expected
gains from the illegal and legal sectors.
In this case, we have
δ =
α
1 + β1
, δ1 =
β1 − β2
1 + β1
, δ2 =
β2 − β3
1 + β1
, δ7 =
1
1 + β1
, δ8 = − α
1 + β1
, (7)
while the remaining coefficients can be reparameterised conveniently such that
δj = βj/ (1 + β1) for j = 3, ..., 6. Therefore, the null hypothesis can be formulated
as follows:
H0 : δ + δ1 + δ2 + δ3 + δ7 + δ8 = 1. (8)
This set of restrictions is testable in the general model in a standard way. Ac-
knowledging these restrictions leads to an interesting point of symmetry between
economic theory and the econometric specification, which is outlined below.
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Proposition 3 The marginal deterrence effects are ordered, such that the coeffi-
cient of prbarr in (6) is more negative than the coefficient of prbconv, which in
turn is more negative than the coefficient of prbimpr − that is, |β1| > |β2| > |β3|.
Proof. The restrictions in (7) imply that βj = (1 + β1) δj + βj+1 for j = 1, 2, and
also −1 < β1 < 0 because α, δ ∈ (0, 1). Since δj < 0, βj+1 < 0 for j = 1, 2, the
result follows directly.
Thus, Proposition 3 implies the same ordering predicted by economic theory
and therefore provides a further restriction that can be used to test the econometric
specification.
Many of the models used in the literature (see e.g. Table 1) are restricted
versions of (4). For example, static models impose α = 0. Omitting the prob-
ability of arrest and using the unconditional empirical probability of conviction
instead, defined as the ratio between the number of convictions over the number of
crime offences, imposes δ1 = 0. This restriction seems unrealistic and is likely to
lead to omitted variable bias if arrests are correlated with convictions and impris-
onments. In general, models that use unconditional probabilities are subject to
omitted variable bias since they impose invalid restrictions in the aggregate model.
Obviously, models that omit conditional probabilities are also subject to the same
problem. For instance, conviction rates are rarely studied in the literature and the
focus is often on the risk of apprehension and the severity of punishment. Table
5 shows that the parameter estimates of the model of crime can be very sensitive
to omitted variables and typically the effect is to underestimate the impact of the
criminal justice system as a whole.
Notice that the restricted model induces by construction some form of endo-
geneity and therefore warrants estimation based on instrumental variables. This
is outlined in the following remark.
Remark 4 Even in the absence of simultaneity, least-squares based estimation
methods of the restricted model are subject to “ratio bias” that does not appear
in the original model. This is because the denominator in prbarr is endogenous.
Therefore, E (εit| ln prbarrit) 6= 0. This ratio bias does not necessarily arise in
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Table 2: Definitions of variables included in the econometric model of crime
Variable Definition
crm Number of criminal incidents divided by total population
prbarr Number of arrests divided by criminal incidents
prbconv Number of convictions divided by arrests
prbimpr Number of imprisonments divided by convictions
avsen Average non-parole period (months) imposed for prison sentences
income Average wage and salary earner income
unemp Unemployment rate (%)
other econometric models that involve ratios. For example, consider a cost func-
tion, ln costit = β1 ln pricek,it + β2 ln pricel,it + β3 ln pricee,it + γ ln outputit + uit,
where pricek, pricel and pricee denote the price of capital, labour and energy,
respectively, and the remaining variables are self-explanatory. Under linear ho-
mogeneity in input prices, β1 + β2 + β3 = 1, which implies that the model can be
written as ln
(
costit
pricee,it
)
= β1 ln
pricek,it
pricee,it
+β2 ln
(
pricel
pricee,it
)
+γ ln outputit+uit. Assum-
ing that firms are price takers (competitive markets), pricee is strongly exogenous
and therefore the transformed regressors remain strongly exogenous; for example,
E
(
uit| ln pricek,itpricee,it
)
= 0.
5 Data Analysis, Estimation and Results
5.1 Data
We construct a new dataset containing information on criminal activity and de-
terrence for all 153 local government areas in New South Wales, each one observed
over a period of thirteen years from 1995/96 to 2007/08. The Australian Standard
Geographic Classification (ASGC) defines the LGA as the lowest level of aggre-
gation following the census Collection District (CD) and Statistical Local Area
(SLA).6 Thus, the LGA represents a low level of aggregation compared to stan-
dard practice in the literature, where regressions using city-, state- and country-
level data are common. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first panel data
6Each CD contains on average about 225 households (2001 Census). There are about 37,000
CDs throughout Australia. The boundaries of an SLA are designed to be typically coterminous
with Local Government Areas unless the LGA does not fit entirely into a Statistical Subdivision,
or is not of a comparative nature to other LGA’s. There are 193 SLAs in NSW.
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model of crime that has been constructed for Australia. The raw data for crime
offences and deterrence variables have been purchased from the NSW Bureau of
Crime Statistics and Research. Income and population data have been obtained
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) website, while the unemployment
data have been purchased from the Small Area Labour Markets division of the
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR).
The NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research provides two alternative
definitions for average prison sentence; average non-parole period and average head
sentence. We use the non-parole period in the analysis because this represents
more closely the actual amount of time spent in confinement. The raw data for
income and population are not readily comparable with the crime data because
they are based on different ASGC standards, i.e. LGA boundaries are defined
slightly differently by the NSW Bureau and the ABS. To achieve consistency, we
mapped the data to a common ASGC standard (2006) using a series of concordance
tables. Similarly, the unemployment data were first mapped to the same ASGC
standard (2006) to account for name and boundary changes that occured in the
LGAs over the sample period. The resulting SLA data were then aggregated to
the LGA level to be directly comparable to the other data.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the different categories of crime con-
sidered in our analysis. As expected, the mean value of the rate of violent crime
is smaller than that of non-violent crime and it exhibits a much smaller disper-
sion as well, which indicates that violent crime occurs less frequently and is more
localised. The empirical probability of arrest and the probability of imprisonment
are both higher on average for violent crime, although the opposite occurs for the
probability of conviction, which is perhaps reflective of the fact that for violent
crime, police are more likely to bring a prosecution when a case is weak and more
jury trials. The mean value of average sentence length is much larger than the
value in the 90th percentile, which shows that there is a relatively small number
of very big sentences in the sample.
19
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Crime type Mean Standard
deviation
10th Per-
centile
90th Per-
centile
Crime rate
Total .133 .088 .064 .218
Non-violent .100 .070 .043 .176
Violent .034 .024 .016 .049
Probability of arrest
Total .313 .117 .169 .466
Non-violent .308 .124 .156 .471
Violent .344 .128 .198 .505
Probability of conviction
Total .489 .144 .325 .673
Non-violent .506 .177 .301 .739
Violent .340 .140 .200 .500
Probability of imprisonment
Total .071 .040 .031 .118
Non-violent .071 .046 .031 .119
Violent .159 .129 .060 .290
Average sentence (days)
Total 280.1 4767.9 5.7 15
Non-violent 37.9 1013.6 4.5 11.6
Violent 608.1 9672.3 2 25.6
Income ($ ’000) — 34.01 9.4 25.18 44.03
Unemployment (%) — 7.07 5.1 3.05 12.36
Descriptive statistics computed for the variables used in regression analysis. N = 153 and T = 13, yielding a
total of 1,989 observations.
5.2 Estimation method and results
We analyse total crime, non-violent and violent crime sequentially, based on the
econometric model studied in the previous section. The composite error term is
specified as follows:
υit = ηi + τt + µit + εit.
Therefore, υit allows for unobserved regional-level effects that may be correlated
with the regressors, ηi, such as geographical location and crime reporting con-
ventions, as well as time effects that capture common variations in crime across
regions, τt. µit reflects a serially uncorrelated measurement error and εit is the
usual random error component.7 The results are obtained using the Generalised
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator developed originally by Hansen (1982) and
extended for dynamic panel data models by Arellano and Bond (1991), Ahn and
7Some measurement error is likely to be present − especially in measuring average sentence
length, as this does not control for the criminal history of the offender, or the type of the offence.
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Schmidt (1995), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), among
others. GMM is a natural choice when multiple explanatory variables are en-
dogenous. Furthermore, the GMM approach has the advantage that it avoids full
specification of the serial correlation and heteroskedasticity properties of the error,
or indeed any other distributional assumptions. Our model specifies all explana-
tory variables as endogenous. The underlying reason for such treatment of the
deterrence variables has already been motivated in Section 3. Errors in measure-
ment may also contribute to endogeneity of the regressors. In addition, we treat
average income as endogenous since crime has a direct effect on economic activity
and thereby on employment. Similar considerations apply to the unemployment
rate.
Table 4 shows the results for the model of total crime. For comparison purposes
we also report results based on the within-group (WG), or fixed effects, estimator,
which although frequently used is inconsistent under endogeneity. The long-run
estimates are computed by dividing the short-run slope coefficients by one mi-
nus the estimated autoregressive parameter. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses, which are valid under arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation. Furthermore, for GMM specifically we perform the correction
proposed by Windmeijer (2005) for the finite-sample bias of the standard errors
of the two-step GMM estimator.8 The standard errors of the long run estimated
parameters are subsequently obtained using the formula for the approximation of
the variance of a ratio of coefficients.9 For GMM we also report the p-value of
Hansen’s test of overidentifying restrictions and the p-value of Arellano and Bond’s
(1991) test of serial correlation of the disturbances up to third order. The former
is used to determine empirically the validity of the overidentifying restrictions in
the GMM model. The null hypothesis is that the model is correctly specified. The
latter is useful because it provides an indication of the appropriate lag length of
the instruments to be used, since instruments are required to be orthogonal to
8All results have been obtained using David Roodman’s xtabond2 algorithm in Stata 11. The
interested reader may refer to Roodman (2009).
9This is given by V ar(a/b) = (1/b2)V ar(a) + (a2/b4)V ar(b) − 2(a/b3)Cov(a, b), where a =
βj , j = 1− 6 and b = (1− α).
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the error term. On the bottom of the table, we also report the p-value of the
test statistic of the joint null hypothesis formulated in (8), as well as the p-value
of the hypothesis that the marginal deterrence effects are ordered sequentially.
Together, these hypotheses provide a testing framework for the implications of
economic theory on crime behavior.
Table 4: Estimated marginal elasticities for total crime
WG GMM
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run
Lagged crime rate .334*** — .350*** —
(.023) (.082)
Probability of arrest -.551*** -.827*** -.865*** -1.33***
(.035) (.074) (.095) (.249)
Probability of conviction -.540*** -.811*** -.575*** -.885***
(.036) (.068) (.093) (.178)
Probability of imprisonment -.039*** -.059*** -.218** -.335**
(.011) (.017) (.123) (.196)
Average sentence .004 .005 -.251*** -.386**
(.003) (.004) (.107) (.176)
Income -.079 -.119 -1.03** -1.584**
(.100) (.150) (.452) (.833)
Unemployment .028** .042** .626*** .962***
(.013) (.020) (.162) (.283)
p-value overidentifying restrictions — .674
p-value serial correlation
- Lag 1 — .017
- Lag 2 — .199
- Lag 3 — .131
p-value of H0 in (8) .033 .814
p-value of ordered effects
- H0 : βA − βC|A = 0 .732 .008
- H0 : βC|A − βP |C = 0 .000 .034
Robust and bias-corrected standard errors reported in parentheses. Each regression includes LGA-specific
effects and time-specific effects. NT = 153× 12 = 1, 836 observations. * indicates significance at the 10 pe-
rcent level; ** and *** indicate significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels respectively, using one-tail tests.
Clearly there is substantial difference between the WG and GMM estimates;
in particular, the former appears to significantly underestimate the effect of all
explanatory variables, which demonstrates the importance of accounting for endo-
geneity in crime activity. The GMM estimates of the parameters are statistically
significant and of the expected sign in the short- and the long-run. Thus, one per-
cent increase in the probability of arrest appears to decrease the expected value of
the crime rate by .865 percent in the short-run and 1.33 percent in the long-run,
ceteris paribus. Likewise, the elasticity of the probability of conviction is about
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-.575 and -.885 in the short- and long-run respectively. The fact that the esti-
mated elasticities are larger in the long-run is well anticipated, since typically one
needs time to adjust fully to changes in law enforcement policies, due to habitual
behavior, imperfect knowledge and uncertainty. In particular, the value of the
autoregressive parameter indicates that it takes about 2.5 time periods for ninety
percent of the total impact of either one of the explanatory variables on crime to
be realised, all else being constant.
The estimated coefficients of the probability of imprisonment and the aver-
age sentence length are not statistically different. This is consistent with the
result we would expect if criminals responded to the expected length of sen-
tence as a single factor. In particular, define the expected length of sentence
as e = prbimpr × avsen. Taking logs yields ln e = ln prbimpr + ln avsen. This
implies that the likelihood of imprisonment and the severity of punishment bear
equal importance in reducing crime. If this is true then policies targeting prison
sentence length as opposed to imprisonment probability do not differ in their ef-
fectiveness. Furthermore, they both appear to exhibit a much smaller effect on
crime compared to the probability of arrest and the probability of conviction. This
shows that imprisoning more criminals, or imprisoning them for longer, is not as
effective as increasing the risk of apprehension or conviction once captured.
The above provides support to the idea that the consequences of being arrested
and found guilty of a criminal offence include the indirect sanctions imposed by
society and not just the punishment meted out by the criminal justice system.
A convicted individual may no longer enjoy the same opportunities in the labour
market or the same treatment by their peers, and so the opportunity cost of lost
income and the cost to the individual of social stigmatisation is implied in the
event of conviction. For example, Zimring and Hawkins (1973, pg. 174) argue:
“Official actions can set off societal reactions that may provide poten-
tial offenders with more reason to avoid conviction than the officially
imposed unpleasantness of punishment” (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973).
The results suggest that the lost social standing resulting from a conviction
23
may well outweigh the effects of prison sentence, let alone a fine or community
service order.
The effect of income and unemployment appears to be large and statistically
significant. However, these coefficients are substantially different, suggesting that
in formulating the crime-no crime decision individuals may consider more the level
than the certainty of income flowing from the legal sector, which is consistent with
Becker’s conception of criminals as risk-seeking. Furthermore, crime appears to
be unit-elastic in the short-run with respect to income but elastic in the long-run.
On the other hand, crime is inelastic with respect to changes in unemployment.
The joint hypothesis formulated in (8) is not rejected when the test statistic is
based on the GMM estimated parameters, while the hypothesis that the deterrence
coefficients are statistically the same is rejected at the 5 percent level. This is in
stark contrast to the WG-based tests, which yield the opposite results in both
cases. Again, this demonstrates the importance of accounting for endogeneity in
order to obtain findings consistent with economic theory.
Table 5 reports results with respect to a number of models that are subject
to different sources of mis-specification error. For comparison purposes we also
include the full model, estimated before and containing all variables prescribed by
economic theory. Model (2) is similar to many of the models estimated in the lit-
erature, in that it specifies a static relation between crime and deterrence. Clearly
the exclusion of the lagged dependent variable results in underestimating all coeffi-
cients without exception, which is not surprising given that crime and therefore its
lagged value are negatively correlated with most of the regressors. Hansen’s test
statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified at the five
percent level, while the null of serially uncorrelated disturbances is rejected even
for up to third order serial correlation. Model (3) omits the probability of arrest
and makes use of the unconditional empirical probability of conviction instead, de-
fined as number of convictions divided by crime offences. The results are similar
in the sense that all estimated coefficients are smaller in absolute value compared
to the full model. Furthermore, Hansen’s test statistic rejects the null hypothesis
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that the instruments used are valid at the five percent level. This is expected
given that omitted variables may invalidate the restriction that the instruments
are orthogonal to the error term. Model (4) commits a common mis-specification
error in that it includes only the probability of arrest and the average sentence
length from the set of deterrence variables. Finally, Model (5) restricts attention
to the likelihood and severity of punishment.10 It is worth noting that the impact
of omitted variables appears to be absorbed by the lagged dependent variable in
all of the relevant mis-specified models, thus producing invalid inferences for the
dynamic process of the crime equation. In summary, we can see that the estimated
parameters of the total crime equation can be very sensitive to the specification
of the model, and typically mis-specification errors result in obtaining estimates
that show a smaller effect of the deterrence variables compared to the full model,
which corroborates the results of Mustard (2003). This is not surprising because
as shown in Table 6, most of the explanatory variables are mutually negatively
correlated in the sample.
The following table reports estimates of the parameters by type of crime. As
we can see, there are some stark differences between non-violent and violent crime.
The former seems to resemble relatively more closely the model for total crime,
which is expected given that about three quarters of all crime is non-violent.
The null hypothesis of correct specification is not rejected in either of the two
models. Likewise, the null hypothesis formulated in (8) is supported empirically
in both cases. However, the hypothesis of sequential ordering of the coefficients
of deterrence variables is supported only for non-violent crime. This indicates
that the idea of rational behavior towards illegal activity may apply only to non-
violent crime. This is also manifestated through the actual estimates of the model
parameters. For example, the effect of punishment, both in terms of likelihood
and severity, is statistically significant only for non-violent crime, and even so it
remains small compared to the effect of the likelihood of arrest and conviction.
Moreover, income and unemployment appear to have an appreciably smaller effect
10Similarly as before, the likelihood of imprisonment refers to the unconditional probability,
defined as number of imprisonments divided by crime offences.
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Table 5: Sensitivity of parameter estimates to omitted variables†
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged crime rate .350*** .517*** .617*** .577***
(.080) (.108) (.101) (.108)
Probability of arrest -.865*** -.652*** -.485***
(.090) (.223) (.150)
Probability of conviction -.575*** -.380*** -.357***
(.090) (.149) (.107)
Probability of imprisonment -.218** -.194* .122** -.077
(.120) (.122) (.055) (.080)
Average sentence -.251*** .129 .077* -.071 .048
(.110) (.126) (.056) (.093) (.078)
Income -1.03** -.991*** -.389
(.450) (.395) (.308)
Unemployment .626*** .246* .266** .245*** .325***
(.160) (.150) (.124) (.098) (.133)
p-value overidentifying .002 .032 .011 .004 .009
restrictions
p-value serial correlation
- Lag 1 .017 .151 .000 .000 .000
- Lag 2 .199 .072 .687 .792 .458
- Lag 3 .131 .035 .007 .150 .003
Robust and bias-corrected standard errors reported in parentheses. Each regression includes LGA-specific
effects and time effects, and is estimated by GMM using NT = 153× 12 = 1, 836 observations. * indicates
significance at the 10 percent level; ** and *** indicate significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels respecti-
vely.
Table 6: Correlation matrix for explanatory variables in total crime equation
ln prbarr ln prbconv ln prbimpr ln avsen ln income ln unemp
ln prbarr 1
ln prbconv -.319 1
ln prbimpr .274 -.212 1
ln avsen -.174 .111 -.039 1
ln income -.542 .340 -.436 .163 1
ln unemp .282 -.251 .299 -.021 -.519 1
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on violent crime.
Table 7: Elasticity estimates by type of crime
Violent crime Non-violent crime
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run
Lagged crime rate .642*** — .366*** —
(.125) (.087)
Probability of arrest -.258*** -.720** -.920*** -1.45***
(.093) (.367) (.161) (.383)
Probability of conviction -.273*** -.763*** -.581** -.916***
(.044) (.258) (.103) (.219)
Probability of imprisonment -.002 -.005 -.179** -.282**
(.054) (.150) (.102) (.170)
Average sentence .008 .023 -.210*** -.331**
(.032) (.087) (.107) (.161)
Income -.268 -.748 -1.115*** -1.759**
(.294) (1.029) (.436) (.832)
Unemployment .198*** .554** .305*** .481***
(.065) (.306) (.111) (.196)
p-value overidentifying restrictions .514 .726
p-value serial correlation
- Lag 1 .000 .005
- Lag 2 .631 .316
- Lag 3 .099 .303
p-value of H0 in (8) .881 .794
p-value of ordered effects
- H0 : βA − βC|A = 0 .856 .012
- H0 : βC|A − βP |C = 0 .000 .000
Robust and bias-corrected standard errors reported in parentheses. Each regression includes LGA-specific
effects and time effects, and is estimated by GMM using NT = 153× 12 = 1, 836 observations. * indicates
significance at the 10 percent level; ** and *** indicate significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels respecti-
vely.
Finally, it is worth emphasising that violent crime is characterised by higher
persistence, since the value of the autoregressive coefficient is almost double that
of non-violent crime. Thus, while for non-violent crime it takes about 2.5 periods
for ninety percent of the total (i.e. long-run) effect of either one of the deterrence
variables to be realised, all other things being constant, violent crime requires
about 6 periods for the same effect to occur. This is anticipated since violent
crime may be attributed to factors which are fundamentally different and less
prone to be calculated in the type of manner implied by economic theory. The
following figure illustrates the dynamic path of the various types of crime following
a one percent increase in the probability of arrest. One can see that the long-run
estimated elasticity of the probability of arrest is smaller for violent crime and it
also takes much longer to adjust to equilibrium compared to non-violent crime.
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Similar results hold for the remaining explanatory variables, albeit they converge
to a different equilibrium level.
Figure 2: Dynamic path of total crime: probability of arrest
6 Concluding Remarks
We estimate an econometric model for crime using a new panel of data set contain-
ing information on illegal activity and deterrence variables for local government
areas in NSW. Our findings suggest that the criminal justice system can poten-
tially exert a much larger impact on crime compared to previous estimates in the
literature, particularly for non-violent crime. We show that the estimated param-
eters can be very sensitive to model mis-specification, the exclusion of relevant
deterrence variables and the lack of a proper identification strategy under endo-
geneity. These factors typically tend to understate the effect of law enforcement
policies, which may explain the difference between the results presented in this
paper and those reported in a large body of empirical work.
From a policy design perspective, it appears that targeting the risk of appre-
hension and conviction are more effective strategies than increasing the severity
of punishment, which indicates that the increasingly higher rates of incarceration
observed across the world are not justified.
Moreover, violent crime appears to be more persistent and relatively less re-
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sponsive to changes in law enforcement policies compared to non-violent crime.
This result is natural given that Becker’s idea of a criminal behaving in a rational
manner is less likely to apply to violent crime, which is often influenced by feelings
of anger and jealousy.
There are several interesting issues that remain to be explored. In particular,
given our analysis it would be useful to measure the effectiveness of different police
activities in influencing the risk of apprehension and determining the empirical
probability of arrest following an offence. Furthermore, from an economic point
of view it is inviting to examine the costs and benefits associated with crime
prevention. We intend to pursue both of these issues in future research.
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A Proof of propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Differentiating (3) with respect to each deterrence variable we obtain:
∂E(UNLi )
∂PAi
= −[UNLi (Yi)− PC|Ai[PP |CiUNLi (Yi − Ci − Si) +
(1− PP |Ci)UNLi (Yi − Ci − S ′i)]− (1− PC|Ai)UNLi (Yi − Ci)] (9)
∂E(UNLi )
∂PC|Ai
= −PAi[UNLi (Yi − Ci)− PP |CiUNLi (Yi − Ci − Si)−
(1− PP |Ci)UNLi (Yi − Ci − S ′i)] (10)
∂E(UNLi )
∂PP |Ci
= −PAiPC|Ai[UNLi (Yi − Ci − S ′i)− UNLi (Yi − Ci − Si)]. (11)
Proposition 1 implies that each of (9), (10) and (11) must be negative, and so in
each case the terms inside brackets must be positive. For the term in brackets in
(9), UNLi (Yi) is deflated by a weighted average of two numbers smaller than itself,
since the first number in the average is itself a weighted average of two numbers
smaller than UNLi (Yi) and the second number, U
NL
i (Yi − Ci), is also smaller than
UNLi (Yi). For the bracketed term in (10), U
NL
i (Yi − Ci) is deflated by a weighted
average of two numbers smaller than itself (assuming Si, S
′
i > 0). Therefore, (9)
and (10) are negative assuming that Ui is an increasing function of the income of
criminal activity. The bracket term in (11) is negative if the earlier assumption
that prison is the most severe sanction for the particular crime (Si > S
′
i) is met.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The negative point elasticities of expected utility with respect to unit increases
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in each of the deterrence variables are obtained from (9), (10) and (11) to allow
a comparison of the marginal disutility associated with a unit increase in each
probability.
−∂E(U
NL
i )
∂PAi
PAi
E(UNLi )
=
1
E(UNLi )
PAiU
NL
i (Yi)
− 1
E(UNLi )
{
PAiPC|Ai
[
PP |CiUNLi (Yi − Ci − Si) + (1− PP |Ci)UNLi (Yi − Ci − S ′i)
]}
− 1
E(UNLi )
[
PAi(1− PC|Ai)UNLi (Yi − Ci)
]
=
1
E(UNLi )
[
PAiU
NL
i (Yi)− PAiPC|AiPP |CiUNLi (Yi − Ci − Si)
]
− 1
E(UNLi )
[
PAiPC|Ai(1− PP |Ci)UNLi (Yi − Ci − S ′i) + PAi(1− PC|Ai)UNLi (Yi − Ci)
]
.
(12)
−∂E(U
NL
i )
∂PC|Ai
PC|Ai
E(UNLi )
=
1
E(UNLi )
PC|AiPAi
[
UNLi (Yi − Ci)− PP |CiUNLi (Yi − Ci − Si)
]
− 1
E(UNLi )
PC|AiPAi(1− PP |Ci)UNLi (Yi − Ci − S ′i)
=
1
E(UNLi )
[
PAiPC|AiUNLi (Yi − Ci)− PAiPC|AiPP |CiUNLi (Yi − Ci − Si)
]
− 1
E(UNLi )
[
PAiPC|Ai(1− PP |Ci)UNLi (Yi − Ci − S ′i)
]
.
(13)
−∂E(U
NL
i )
∂PP |Ci
PP |Ci
E(UNLi )
=
=
1
E(UNLi )
PAiPC|AiPP |Ci
[
UNLi (Yi − Ci − S ′i)− UNLi (Yi − Ci − Si)
]
=
1
E(UNLi )
[
PAiPC|AiPP |CiUNLi (Yi − Ci − S ′i)− PAiPC|AiPP |CiUNLi (Yi − Ci − Si)
]
.
(14)
34
Subtracting (13) from (12) yields
1
E(UNLi )
{PAiUNLi (Yi)− PAi(1− PC|Ai)UNLi (Yi − Ci)− PAiPC|AiUNLi (Yi − Ci)}
=
PAi
E(UNLi )
{UNLi (Yi)− PC|AiUNLi (Yi − Ci)− (1− PC|Ai)UNLi (Yi − Ci)}
=
PAi
E(UNLi )
{UNLi (Yi)− UNLi (Yi − Ci)}
> 0,
if Ci > 0 and U
NL
i is an increasing function of the benefit of criminal activity.
Under these conditions, the marginal disutility associated with an increase in PAi
is greater than that associated with a corresponding increase in PC|Ai. Subtracting
(14) from (13) yields
1
E(UNLi )
{EPAiPC|AiUNLi (Yi − Ci)− PAiPC|Ai(1− PP |Ci)UNLi (Yi − Ci − S ′i)−
PAiPC|AiPP |CiUNLi (Yi − Ci − S)i ′}
=
PAiPC|Ai
E(UNLi )
{UNLi (Yi − Ci)− PP |CiUNLi (Yi − Ci − S ′i)−
(1− PP |Ci)UNLi (Yi − Ci − S ′i)}
=
PAiPC|Ai
E(UNLi )
{UNLi (Yi − Ci)− UNLi (Yi − Ci − S ′i)}
> 0,
provided that S ′i > 0 and U
NL
i is an increasing function of the benefit from criminal
activity. It follows that the deterrent effects of the criminal justice system are
ordered according to Proposition 2 if Ci, S
′
i > 0 and utility increases with the
benefit of criminal activity.
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